This article chronicles the developing relationship between the press corps on the British side and British Military Intelligence during the Anglo-Boer War, particularly during the formal and non-guerrilla phase of the conflict. The article comments on the nature and composition of both the press corps and of the military intelligence operation. In particular, the article looks at the problem and issues relating to the relationship: licensing correspondents, censorship, monitoring journalists' activities, as well as the successful attempt of the intelligence sector to bring the press into their campaign to spread pro-British propaganda. The role of the press in the saga of the attempt to make British Military Intelligence a scapegoat for British initial failures is also mentioned.
Introduction
This article reports on the (at times) uneasy relationship between the British press corps in the field and British Military Intelligence, especially in the initial and formal part of the Anglo-Boer War. 1 This is significant because this conflict was the first British imperial war in which there was a substantial press corps attached to the British field force. Much has been made of individual war correspondents in the earlier conflicts in India, the Crimean, Afghanistan and Sudan between the 1850s and 1880. However, these were colourful stalwart individual reporters and sometimes army officers writing the occasional despatch to the British metropolitan press. There was no recognisable British press corps as such attached to the British army prior to this South African conflict. 2 The first thing which strikes one is how large the press corps was in this conflict. During the war, 88 newspapers and journals employed at least 263 war correspondents on the British fronts. To this needs to be added the three journalists employed by two commercial companies and 47 journalists working for five news-gathering agencies. As illustrated in Table 1 , this total figure of 313 has to be reduced slightly as 26 correspondents reported for two newspapers or agencies, seven correspondents reported for three, and another three journalists for four newspapers or agencies. The total number of named war correspondents on the British side was, therefore, no fewer than 276. 3 Of course, these were not all here at once. Correspondents came and went, but nonetheless, this is probably the largest number of war correspondents ever to cover an imperial war in the history of the British Empire.
The principal actors in this press corps are reflected in Tables 2 and 3 , with Reuters employing 28 correspondents, followed by the Daily Mail, The Times and the Morning Post. Stephen Badsey states that Reuters actually employed over 100 correspondents and stringers in Southern Africa during the war. 4 Not all of these war correspondents were male. Miss Bateman, Lady Briggs, Mary Kingsley (Morning Post), Miss Maguire (Reuters), and Lady Sarah Wilson (Daily Mail) were all war correspondents. In addition, there were various American, nationalist Irish, continental European and even a few British journalists who covered the war in a fairly leisurely style from the Afrikaner side. Pretoria's Grand Hotel was the general meeting place for these correspondents, several of whom were under a kind of lax house arrest, but who had access to anyone who cared to pop in and to the bar of the hotel. So lax was security that on one occasion, a guard asked his journalist prisoner to look after his rifle while he went off to see his girlfriend. 5 There were some casualties within the British press corps. On 6 June 1900, the Daily Express published a list of these, possibly because its rival the Daily Mail featured so prominently. There was an 18 per cent casualty rate, with six war correspondents being killed, three dying of disease, 13 going down with fever, six being wounded and 19 being taken prisoner. These figures do not include the unnamed German photographer who was caught by some British scouts on the top of Spioen Kop, piling up the bodies of dead British soldiers for a ghoulish picture. One of the scouts raised his rifle and, without a word, shot and killed the correspondent. 6 The significance of these figures is that the war was covered in great detail; the eye-witness account, real or imaginary, now being all important. This in turn meant that there was a very real danger that an enemy commander might gain important details from the British press of British positions, troop numbers and troop movements. 
Number of papers/news agencies

Anti-British correspondents
If the press corps on the imperial side were generally sympathetic to the British, it is largely true to say that their colleagues across the firing line tended to be avidly pro-Boer. The removal of Reuters' general manager in South Africa, MJM Bellasyse, by Baron de Reuter, was the consequence of a British complaint of his being too sympathetic towards the Boers. 8 Several other foreign correspondents also got into serious trouble with the British. The dividing line between observer and participant was not very clear and several war correspondents crossed that line to their cost. One Dutch war reporter, M Uytenhoudt, found himself rounded up by the British and made a prisoner of war in Ceylon. 9 This was in terms of the newly operational Hague Convention (1899), which granted prisoner of war status to captured accredited war correspondents.
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A more famous case was that of an Irish Australian, Arthur Lynch, who arrived in the Transvaal in early 1900 as a reporter for Black and White, Collier's Weekly and Le Petit Journal. He then proceeded to establish an Irish commando in the Boer army. Having briefly seen service in the Natal war zone, the commando disintegrated and Lynch slipped out of the Transvaal into Mozambique and made his way to Paris.
11
In 1901, Lynch stood and won the Irish parliamentary seat of Galway. On arriving in England from France to take up that seat, he was arrested, tried for high treason and sentenced to death. The successful argument of the crown prosecutor was that Lynch had gone to the Transvaal as a journalist after hostilities had commenced and then taken out Transvaal citizenship and became a combatant for the enemy. Had Lynch become a burger before war was declared, he would have been in the clear. Lynch was later pardoned and released. 12 But not all foreign correspondents were anti-British. Erland Mossberg 
British military intelligence
Technically, British military intelligence had existed only since 1873 though, in fact, its origins long predate that. From 1896 to 1901, the lanky, quiet and taciturn Major General Sir John Ardagh (1840-1907) was director of the British War Office's Department of Military Intelligence, based in a "lofty and commodious mansion" in Queen Anne's Gate. To his office staff, Ardagh was known as the Marabou, presumably because he looked like a stork ('the undertaker bird') and had a lugubrious and hermit-like air about him. 14 Military Intelligence had seven sections devoted mainly to producing reports and maps. But once a war was declared, individual military commanders in the field were in charge of battlefield strategy and as such had their own intelligence networks. Truth to tell, the Intelligence Section in London was not regarded as being terribly important prior to 1899. 15 That only £11 000 was spent on the department annually for operations worldwide is telling, with a mere £2 000 a year on South African intelligence at a time when the Transvaal Republic was lavishing £92 000 annually on its intelligence network. 16 As war in South Africa appeared inevitable, a handful of intelligence officers, under Major David Henderson (the Cape) and Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Manning (Natal), were sent out to set up spy and guide networks. LS Amery of The Times may have been biased, but he was not far off the mark when he later noted, We did not spend nearly enough money, or send enough [intelligence] officers; the eight, or ten, or a dozen officers who went out did very good work, I know, but they were fewer than the men I employed myself as 'Times' correspondents anywhere, or even a commercial traveller, with the sums of money they were given. 17 When Field Marshal Lord Roberts arrived to take command of the British army in the field in January 1900, there were six intelligence officers attached to his staff, under Lieutenant Colonel George Henderson (1854-1903) with his number two, Captain William Robertson, along with four DAAGs (Deputy Assistant Adjutant Generals), all former staff college students. They were a jolly crowd, with their own mess. According to the satirical Ladysmith Lyre, an intelligence DAAG had written a new song entitled 'I ain't goin' to tell'. 18 It was all par for the course.
Henderson ensured that every military column had its own intelligence officer, but General Buller ran his own show. 19 Henderson's job was daunting. He had to deal with estimating the enemies' strength and probable actions; assessing and providing maps to military commanders; reading intercepted enemy mail; censoring press reports; but in addition, as LS Amery of The Times asserted, they had to deal with "all sorts of things, like water supply, the character of the different commandants, and the supply of food in different places". 20 Later in the war, Intelligence had to search out and deport undesirables, interview captured deserters and prisoners of war, and oversee an enormous network of scouts and guides.
The day-to-day running of the intelligence network rested with the senior intelligence officers on the ground. In 1899, the staff of the London Intelligence Division, including temporary staff, stood at 60. By 1902, it had increased to 91, but by then this included the army's mobilisation staff. The cost of running the division increased during the war from £18 917 a year to £28 021.
Handling the press: Issuing of press licences
When the war commenced, a Major Jones was the British censor in South Africa. His rules were so few that they were printed on the back of the correspondent's licence, as the War Office credentials were called. 21 The issuing of licences to foreign correspondents on the British side became an issue when a German journalist, Dr Richter, tried unsuccessfully to get one. As the adjutant general noted, If it can be avoided I hope that licences will be refused to all foreign correspondents -they are only spies -that it is not a matter in which I can express any positive opinion -All I can say is that as everyone knows correspondents are a great deal of trouble and I hope the War Office will limit them as much as possible.
The correspondence around this matter reveals the chaotic and inconsistent manner in which it was all handled. It was proposed that no more than two licences be granted to any particular paper, that licences only be granted to dailies with a circulation above 20 000, and that no foreigners be granted licences. 23 None of these proposals was imposed. In truth, the general attitude in London was, as the Secretary for War noted, "They [foreign correspondents] will have to go out [to South Africa] at their own risk, and it will be for the local milt. Authorities to deal with them, if they present themselves. We can make an exception in favour of one or two Americans." 24 The chaos was further compounded by the fact that no single centralised list of war correspondents existed. War correspondents had to be issued with a licence, which could be granted in London by the War Office or at a number of military bases in South Africa, as well as in Cape Town. It appears that no British correspondent was ever refused a licence. Two further complications existed. Though a grey area, many British soldiers, including privates and officers, had 'letters' published in British local and sometimes national newspapers, some of which were genuine family letters but others were thinly disguised press despatches. Churchill is the most famous culprit but there were others as well. 25 Secondly, there
were the wealthy hangers-on, who masqueraded as journalists but who were only interested in witnessing front-line action.
Censorship
Martial law was declared in Natal, though not in the Cape, at the outbreak of war on 11 October 1899. This pretty well gave General Buller a free hand to deal with the press as he pleased. The Cape, however, was trickier and there no regulations existed to cover either the censor or the correspondents. As Colonel Lord Stanley, Roberts' chief press censor and later also private secretary remarked, there were "some hints in Lord Wolseley's [soldier's] pocket-book and a paragraph in the Army act which placed correspondents on the same footing as camp followers".
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As early as June 1889 when adjutant general of the British army, Buller had attempted to introduce regulations restricting both the number of war correspondents and the scope of their work, to the point of censorship. The matter was taken up again in March 1899 when General Evelyn Wood, then the army's adjutant general, proposed draconian legislation curbing the power of the press in time of war, along the lines of legislation introduced by imperial Germany in 1874. This involved banning the publication of news as to "the movement of troops or measures of defence". 27 He was backed both by the army's commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Lord Wolseley, and by Sir John Ardagh from Military Intelligence. 28 Not surprisingly, Lord Lansdowne, the Secretary for War, was hesitant because of the inevitable outcry in the British parliament and the press. But, secretly, a draft bill aimed at curbing the press in wartime was prepared by Military Intelligence, to be kept in abeyance pending an emergency. Needless to say, this sent the War Office into a frenzy. But again, Lansdowne in the War Office quashed the idea of legislation on political grounds. It was clear that the only way forward was by regulation on the ground and in particular by censorship of telegraphic communications. Lansdowne attempted to do this, but found that, as martial law had not yet been introduced in the Cape, as it had in Natal, he was on shaky ground. Martial law was only imposed in the Cape in January 1902. Be that as it may, censorship was regarded as essential.
In late October 1899, General Buller, then commanding the British army in South Africa, tried to resurrect his earlier, now moribund 1889 rules. These included denying licences to correspondents from small-circulation newspapers and clearing out freelance journalists. The latter he particularly disliked, and he considered them merely "wealthy individuals getting out to the seat of war on the pretence of being correspondents". 31 Buller clearly agreed with the Army Act, which classified journalists as camp followers. 32 An example of this was the spendthrift though delightful 5 th Earl of Rosslyn, who reported for the Daily Mail, complete with "my trusty Kodak". 33 He turned up in Natal with a letter from Field Marshal Roberts.
Buller not only refused to accept Roberts' recommendation, saying he did not take orders from Roberts, but he also gave the ruling that, "Rosslyn may proceed to the front on condition he does not correspond with any paper"!
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A scissors-and-paste exercise was carried out on Buller's 1889 Revised rules for newspaper correspondents at the seat of war but the matter did not go much further as Roberts then turned up as the new commander-in-chief. 35 While Buller pursued his own regulations for censorship in Natal, in the Cape Henderson and Stanley tried to rectify matters and create uniformity in practice. 36 While telegrams were the focus of attention, a remarkable flexibility of judgement was given to individual censors. A guide for censors dated 23 January 1900 stated, "No hard and fast rules can be laid down as to what should be allowed to pass." 37 Another circular
limited press messages to 550 words, 150 of which were to pass at full rate and 400 at a reduced but still expensive, press rate of one shilling and nine pence a word. Attempts at regulating the use of codes wasted much time and when finalised in late 1900, still did not prevent journalists using secret, agreed codes with their newspapers.
Censorship of a type existed in the Transvaal Republic but correspondents rarely had trouble getting their telegrams out. The existence of two telegraph lines, one via Barberton and another via Middelburg, also assisted in getting material through to Lourenço Marques (Maputo). Indeed, there appears to have been a race by British correspondents to get telegrams out of Pretoria before Stanley took control of the telegraph office. 38 Despite blustering from the military censor in Aden that foreign correspondents' telegrams were intercepted and delayed, there is in fact no evidence that this happened in more than a few symbolic instances. 39 The very volume of material going through Aden from South and East Africa and from Asia made this logistically very difficult.
In newly occupied Pretoria, Stanley refused permission to three British war correspondents to set up in the old Volkstem printing works a pro-British newspaper to be called the Imperialist. Instead, he established The Pretoria Friend, which lasted for only 17 issues. 40 Stanley also set about cracking down on the war correspondents.
He created yet another censorship document, the Report on press censorship. But it was not until May 1901 that a 10-page Rules for the guidance of press censors in South Africa was produced. 41 This contained 33 clauses and laid down the following basic tenets:
1. Every military column and important military station would have a censor. 2. All telegrams were to be vetted. The censor had the power to allow, stop or delay a telegram. 3. Letters were 'liable to censorship', but letters to the United Kingdom "as a rule, [were] to pass unopened". 42 Censors were told that they "in no way
[were] responsible for the accuracy of a message", 43 but that "letters to the press emanating from officers and soldiers must be stopped and sent to the Department of Military intelligence". 4. Regulations relating to newspapers and books were fairly lax: British or colonial newspapers or magazines were to pass without interference; South African newspapers were to be delayed for three weeks; and foreign newspapers were to be destroyed, unless they were addressed to officers, soldiers, consuls, government officials or army nurses. Books were "subject to censorship and at the news agent's risk".
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After the fall of Pretoria in June 1900, General Maxwell, the governor, forbade the private carrying of letters by individuals. 46 But the reality on the ground was that censorship in the South African War (the Anglo-Boer War) applied primarily in an irregular fashion to telegrams, though certain out-of-favour periodicals, particularly radical or sensational tracts such as the Truth, Reynold's Weekly and Review of Reviews were confiscated when found. Even after the war had concluded, attempts were being made to block the importation of books about the war which were considered to be pro-Boer.
Technically most censors were not serving members of the Intelligence Department, though some were, such as Capt. TO Fraser in Durban. But the relationship between Military Intelligence and the censors was so close that all censorsmight well have been intelligence officers, and as the war progressed, alterations to the censor regulations were invariably made "after consultation and on the authority of the DMI [Division Military Intelligence]".
Cat-and-mouse game
There were two camps in the British War Office hierarchy (the 'Indian' and the 'African') whose leaders on the ground -Lord Roberts and Lord Wolseleypersonally had very different approaches to the press. This was not just a clash of personalities, but also of approach. Like Buller, the ever-sharp-tongued Wolseley had for long had little time for war correspondents. As far back as the 1870s, he had written in his famous soldiers' pocket book:
Without saying so directly, you can lead your army to believe anything: and as a rule, in all civilised nations, what is believed by the army, will very soon be credited by the enemy, having reached him by means of spies, or through the medium of those newlyinvented curses to armies -I mean newspaper correspondents … Travelling gentlemen, newspaper correspondents, and all that race of drones, are an encumbrance to any army; they eat the rations of fighting men, and do no work at all. Their numbers should be restricted as much as possible … An English general of the present day is in the most unfortunate position in this respect, being surrounded by newspaper correspondents, who, pandering to the public craze for 'news,' render concealment most difficult. However, the post and telegraph will always be in the general's hands, so he can lay an embargo on the mails whenever he wishes it, without its being known for a long time; or he can by spreading false news among the gentlemen of the press, use them as a medium by which to deceive an enemy. 47 Field Marshal Roberts, on the other hand, saw things rather differently. He had had a distinguished career in India and had just published his memoirs, which proved to be the best-seller, Forty-one years in India, an uninspiring title but a wellwritten narrative.
Roberts did not rush matters. His defeat of Cronjé at Paardeberg, his advance through the Orange Free State and into the Transvaal had been carefully organised, with several lengthy stops along the way. This strategy paid off, as did his approach to the press. Roberts lost no opportunity to have a photocall, be it his entering Kroonstad or crossing the Vaal. He also pandered to the press corps, which swarmed around his camp. At one point, for example, he decreed that letters written by war correspondents to their respective papers should go free of all censorship. 48 He did not, however, extend such largesse to South African newspapers. And behind the scenes, Roberts wrote to Buller in January 1900, pressing for him to exert greater control over correspondents "because everything published is immediately telegraphed to Pretoria". 49 But Roberts was not the only one to have sweethearted the headquarters press corps successfully. In the early days of the British advance, Colonel Stanley displayed all the graces and good humour necessary to both entertain and control the press corps. A humorous photograph has survived of Stanley sitting at his small desk, with an oil lamp beside him in his windowless office in Bloemfontein, with his head in his hands, being pestered by a dozen journalists.
Interference with war correspondents tended to depend on circumstances and on whom the journalist encountered. The war artist, Mortimer Menpes, of the illustrated London journal Black and White, recorded trying to paint a sunset scene at the Modder River in January 1900:
No sooner, however, did I get my paint-box, than a funny little commandant appear on the scene, and raised so many objections that I put away my paint-box in disgust. So art is sacrificed to the exigencies of the military situation. 50 In fact, Roberts' press censorship was made largely ineffective by two factors: the decree excluding correspondents' letters from censorship; and, because the British press, and in particular the influential The Times, were largely sympathetic to the British cause, regardless of correspondents not sending out seditious copy to the London presses. British press subjectivity is probably best illustrated in the issue of the treatment of Africans during the war. Initially, they were not slow to denounce the Boer treatment of the disenfranchised and subjugated African populations in the two republics. Ill-treatment of Africans in the British Cape or Natal just did not feature in their reports, nor indeed did it feature BadenPowell's ill-treatment of many Africans in Mafeking. Further, the horrendous conditions inflicted on Africans in the British concentration camps in the latter part of the conflict, were all but ignored, even after Emily Hobhouse's campaign with the Manchester Guardian. 51 The Intelligence Branch was treated as a separate, and not very important, part of the War Office organisation.
The consequence was that I had to rely for my data largely upon reports of war correspondents, which would often appear in the Press before the same information reached me officially, and sometimes the newspapers alone supplied the particular intelligence I wanted. As might be expected, the reports were not always reliable, but they furnished useful indications regarding events at the front, and by carefully following them day by day, and exercising due discretion as to the credibility of individual correspondents -which I was soon able to appraise -the summary proved to be remarkably correct. 53 The scissors-and-paste summaries that Robertson extracted from the reports of war correspondents on both sides became popular in military circles, and he told his readers that demand rose from half a dozen copies to five times that number. Somewhat bizarrely twisting matters, Robertson concluded:
The accuracy of the summary, prepared in the manner described, is an illustration of the useful intelligence which can be gleaned by an enemy from a close study of his adversary's press, and it shows that censorship of military news has greater justification than some people imagine.
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GF Henderson was not untypical of intelligence officers down the ages. Lying, misleading, tricking -all were in his arsenal when dealing with the press. In particular, Henderson made use of the telegraph and postal system to disseminate misleading information and glean new intelligence. Mailbags were regularly intercepted and examined, especially as the British army advanced into enemy territory. With the advent of war, the telegraph system had to be greatly expanded. To this end, the army was forced not only to import thousands of metal telegraph poles but also to contract the telegraph company to provide additional telegraph stations and trained staff to run them.
It should also be noted that the Boers were not averse to using British telegraph wires to send their own messages. 55 The telegraph system was not secure.
To capitalise on this, Henderson despatched enciphered telegrams to military commanders with instructions, which he subsequently cancelled by way of ciphered messages. In confidence, he also fed journalists with false tips. As Robertson later reported:
One of his [Henderson's] tools was a London newspaper correspondent to whom he gave a particularly "confidential" piece of information, with strict injunctions to keep it to himself. As Henderson hoped, it quickly appeared in the London Press, and was brought to our notice by the War Office as a serious indiscretion on the part of some of the staff! 56 Needless to say, when the main British advance occurred far away from that announced by the press all hell broke loose in the press corps. An official complaint concerning "unfair and dishonest treatment" was lodged with Field Marshal Roberts -and duly ignored. 57 The capture of General Cronjé and his army at Paardeberg (27 February 1900) was another intelligence coup, though more through good spying than through the dissemination of false information.
British Military Intelligence met with disaster on St Patrick's Day 1900 with the physical collapse of Henderson. Despite attempting to run the intelligence network in his pyjamas, he was invalided out and returned to Britain. Worn out, Hender, as he was nicknamed, died in 1903.
The Friend
On the whole, British and American journalists were fairly sympathetic to the British cause and were happy enough to go along as prototype embedded journalists, eating army food, using army fodder for their horses, riding out with the patrols, viewing the advance from the frontline and drinking the officers' grog in the mess. This cosy nexus found expression when Roberts agreed to hand over Bloemfontein-based The Friend to the press corps, to be run as the British army's newspaper. 58 It had been three journalists who had ridden into Bloemfontein prior to the British army and suggested to what remained of Boer officialdom that they ride out and present Roberts the keys of the town, in token of submission. This they had done. 59 One of The Friend's editors was later to write:
Lord Roberts is the first General of whom I have heard who ever recognised and acknowledged the Value and Power of the Press by establishing a Newspaper as a source of Entertainment and Information for an Army in the Field, and as a Medium for conveying such Arguments and Appeals as he wished to make to the Enemy. 60 Behind this cunning manoeuvre was Colonel Lord Stanley, whose censor's office in Bloemfontein was described as "a wretched poke-hole of a room" without windows. He compensated The Friend's previous fence-sitting owner to the tune of £40 a week. 
The Field Intelligence Department
The role of the press was less significant under succeeding directors of Intelligence than it had been under Henderson. This was in part due to the changing nature of the war. By 1900, an extensive Field Intelligence Department was in existence, attached to the field headquarters. Field intelligence officers wrote daily, weekly and monthly reports, the last two being telegraphed to London. 65 This intelligence field force fluctuated greatly in numbers, but we do have a 1900 list giving the names of some 734 men. Of these, 93 per cent were military scouts, agents or guides drawn primarily from local colonial units, colonial police and some regular army members. Most could speak Afrikaans. 66 In addition, there were over 100 military lieutenants and captains, 11 majors, five lieutenant colonels and one full colonel. 67 As the war entered its guerrilla phase, these spies were augmented by hundreds of African auxiliaries. It was the view of LS Amery of The Times thatIn the field I do not think nearly enough importance was assigned to the Intelligence officer, and anyone was made Intelligence officer; there were not enough of them, and they were hopelessly overworked. As a rule, any junior officer was made Intelligence officer, and he probably had to do press censorship and permits as well. 68 Needless to say, there were disputes as to who should cover the cost of this scouting network, with the civil authority being resentful at having to pay a third of the salary of the principal agents, a cost they felt had to be carried by the Intelligence section.
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Military intelligence under press attack
When CF Henderson was invalided out of South Africa he was replaced in October 1900 by Colonel CV Hume. 70 Then, from February 1901, under Kitchener, field intelligence was to rest with the now Lieutenant Colonel David Henderson. The latter did much to standardise procedure and divided the region, and with it administering censorship, into four intelligence sectors. By then, though, spying on the enemy, rather than curbing the press, was the main concern of Military Intelligence. By that time, Ardagh had left Military Intelligence and was replaced by a close associate of Roberts, the efficient Lieutenant General Sir William Nicholson (1845-1918), who completely reorganised the Queen Anne's Gate outfit. And in South Africa, Kitchener, lacking the charm of the old man he had succeeded, had his favourites in the press corps and was polite but generally not friendly to the rest. Maybe if he had been more amenable to them, the criticism over his scorched earth policy and the concentration camps would have been more muted, though it needs to be stressed that the press tended to be followers of the likes of Emily Hobhouse and Alice Stopford Green as leaders on the issue of concentration camps, the major exception being the Manchester Guardian with Charles Prestwick Scott as editor and Emily's brother, Leonard Trelawry Hobhouse, on the staff.
More immediate, the British press and public had to have a scapegoat for the military defeats experienced in December 1899 and January 1900. The finger pointing soon settled on Military Intelligence, the accusation being that the division had neglected to give sufficient warning concerning the build-up of Boer power.
Negative stories about Military Intelligence began to appear in the press. By August 1900, The Times was asserting, "For most of our [recent] reverses the blame must rest with our Intelligence Department, whose information was throughout defective". 71 
Propaganda
An interesting light on Military Intelligence and the press and, indeed, on the efficiency of Military Intelligence and its propaganda brief is given by the unusual case of Ernest Luther. He was a 20-year-old German American in an Irish commando who died of wounds in September 1900. With him, Military Intelligence found a diary of his time with the commando. It was full of revealing accounts of drunkenness, internal fighting, the position of Boer commanders and the commandos, use of dum-dum bullets and the like. The diary was rushed into print in Britain by Military Intelligence who used it as propaganda with the press, at least one copy still surviving in the papers of a war correspondent. 74 It was a good example of co-operation between Field Intelligence and headquarters in London.
In May 1901, Major General Sir GW Nicholson replaced Ardagh as intelligence head in London. With mobilisation being joined to his section, Nicholson was elevated to director-general. Near the end of the war, Ardagh himself came out to South Africa at the government's request to be a member of a commission. In writing home to his wife from Pretoria, he made an interesting statement concerning censorship:
I send you a Johannesburg Star, by glancing over which you will perceive how very little information or comment is allowed to leak out here. Not a single word has transpired in the local papers about Lord Methuen's operations of late, and I shall imitate the censor's reserve, as you will know much more than I do, long before this reaches you. We only hear (barring confidential communications) what has taken place when the English newspapers come out a month afterwards. 75 Even when the South African War was in progress, the British military censor ruminated on the prospect for the future, "it is a question in any future war whether or not the Army is to be followed by photographers and cinematograph agents".
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The war comes to an end For the greater part of the war, correspondents attached to military columns had no qualms about living off the military; indeed, on the correspondent's pass was printed, "He is authorised to draw rations for himself and one servant, and forage for one horse". 77 One assistant adjutant general remarked on the "great deal of trouble" this caused, newspaper correspondents come along and they want this, that, and the other thing, and they are supposed to pay for it before they get it, but in nine cases out of ten there is no possible means of getting them to pay for it, and even if they could pay for it, the supply officer does not like to get hold of money, as he might be robbed. 78 The result had been the existence of a loose system of credit and flimsy promissory notes. Only in January 1902 did the army bureaucracy address the matter with an extraordinarily complicated system, which involved filling in a form in quadruple, with the correspondent retaining a copy and copies going to the officer responsible, the supply officer and the paymaster. This was declared to be "quite new" to the army. 79 In this later period with martial law in the Cape, censorship also became stricter as indeed it was in the newly annexed Boer territories. LS Amery of The Times noted, "Little useful information was obtained by the censor, but it no doubt acted as a deterrent to the misuse of the [Transvaal] postal service." 80 In 1903, the British parliament appointed a royal commission to investigate the war up to the annexation of the Transvaal in August 1900. Military Intelligence featured prominently in the investigation. The commission's final report largely exonerated the department from the criticism for not forewarning government and for failing to provide adequate maps, at one point noting that Ardagh had requested £18 000 from the War Office to map South Africa and was offered a mere £100, which never materialised. 81 In the end, though, Military Intelligence did begin drafting maps, and the military found themselves using Jeppe's map of the Transvaal, as well as buying large numbers of Cape maps from the Cape's Office of Public Works. 82 Lansdowne, however, was unrepentant, claiming not to have been properly informed by Intelligence of the situation in South Africa. 83 Nowhere in the commission report there is criticism of the Intelligence Department's handling of the press. Indeed, the whole issue of censorship was not one which concerned the commissioners. Field Marshal Roberts was unambiguous:
I was very well served [by the Intelligence Department] during the war. I think as a rule they gave me -in fact, from my narrative you can see that I had -very good information almost everywhere … I think our intelligence Department now works very well indeed.
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Handing out copper medals At least 13 war correspondents made some money on the side by publishing their wartime experiences. Winston Churchill got two books out of the war and the American journalist Julian Ralph had no fewer than four accounts published. 85 With the exception of Michael Davitt's and Frederik Rompel's volumes, these published war accounts by war correspondents were generally sympathetic towards the British. It is little wonder, therefore, that an unprecedented number of war correspondents were honoured after the war by receiving a medal.
The granting of the Queen's South African Medal to non-participants such as journalists and nurses was not a new concept, nor was it just a British practice. In the Anglo-Boer War, 149 correspondents, representing 47 newspapers and journals, received Queen's campaign medals, without clasp. Sixteen journalists who had been nominated did not receive medals. To qualify the following criteria had to be met: The War Office received letters from journalists requesting to be awarded the South African medal, but also received were some vitriolic letters questioning the claims of names on the proposed list of recipients. In some cases, names were subsequently removed. Those who had held commissions at some time during the war, such as Churchill and Rosslyn, and who were also correspondents, were barred from getting the medal. Some correspondents could not be traced, and Lady Sarah Wilson was struck off the list because she was already on the role of nurses to be honoured. 86 Honouring journalists with copper medals fooled no one. Large numbers of war correspondents had become a serious nuisance and, at times, an embarrassment for the military authorities. The War Office had pushed the problem off onto the military field commanders, who were neither consistent nor unified in their approach to the new phenomenon. Roberts' sweethearting the press corps and keeping them close, while having Military Intelligence not distant in the shadows, was an embryonic form of embedded journalism, but such tactics were not yet favoured by most military commanders. To the emerging generation of officers, the South African War simply demonstrated the need for much greater press control. It is no surprise that, when the prestigious Fleet Street-based Institute of Journalists approached the British government in late 1900 with the suggestion that they should receive the title Royal Institute of Journalism, the request was politely but firmly rejected.
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Conclusion
From the above, the South African conflicts might appear to have been something of a comic opera when it came to the authorities controlling even their own British press correspondents. The issuing of licences was ad hoc and chaotic; the attempts at censorship were inadequate, amateurish and inconsistently applied. The cat-and-mouse game was regarded by both sides as just that, something of a game. The attack on military intelligence and its being blamed for early reverses had more to do with army politics than with the on-the-ground press corps attacking the British war effort. And yet, this war was very significant in terms of the relationship between the press and the military because it proved to be a training ground, a dry run, for the much more effective and efficient control and manipulation of the press a dozen years later when the First World War broke out. All the component parts in the relationship of a military intelligence section and the press were honed and tried in South Africa: licensing, censorship, photo opportunities, what would become known eventually as embedded journalism, and the supply of false or misleading information. All were here in embryo in this African conflict; the Anglo-Boer War was the prelude to a much more thorough, even sinister relationship between the press and the military. 
